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Dickson: <em>Battle of the Generals</em> [Review]

candid and, at times, caustic.
Tact has not always been his
strong suit with the inevitable
result that advancement was
slow. If there are a few words
that might best describe Forbes
they would be "thoroughly
dependable" or "natural leader."
The reader is given early
glimpses of these qualities from
the author's childhood days in the
Gaspe.
There
begins
a
tumultuous and adventurous life
that shows no signs of slowing
down except for the occasional
pause to cope with tragedy or to
catch much-needed breath before
resuming
a
sometimes
hyperactive pace. The result is a
book that bristles with action,
indignation, Rabelaisian humour,
warmth, contempt ... all marks of
a man at once blessed and
damned with perhaps an
overabundance of talent and
energy.
How many men are honest
enough to admit that theirs has
been a life plagued by alcoholism?
Charly is candid enough in this
regard and the mark of the man
is that he was able, despite this
problem, to accomplish the many
things he did. But he is honest
enough to hint at how much more
could have been done without the
bottle and the reader is made to
feel that a large part of his
problem is pride. This pride
coupled with fierce independence
made enemies for Charly which
probably accounts for his having
ended his active military career
as a major. His one-time nemesis,
Jacques Dextraze, cared enough
for him to try to get Forbes to stop
drinking. He pointed out the vast
potential of the man but the
touchy relationship between the
two is worth the read in itself and
Forbes is honest enough to
swallow his pride and admit the
considerable leadership qualities
of the man many of us called "Kid
28."
It would be safe to say that
for every enemy Charly made in
the service, there were many
more friends. Naturally they were

similar types ... men who had
proven themselves in battle such
as Louis Rend Drapeau with his
two well deserved DCMs or Harry
Pope or Guy de Merlis, men who
had little or no use for the
"niceties" aptly called chicken
shit. But the most significant
mark of the man as leader is the
way he is seen by those he leads.
Charly Forbes very simply was
venerated by his men. His total
concern in the field was their
welfare and this he demonstrated
from the very beginning of his
soldier's life to the point where
promotion, family and everything
else became secondary.
Charly's marital difficulties
are diplomatically handled and
nowhere does he indulge in
recrimination. There is also
regret at his not having managed
such matters with more tact but
the call to duty and the need to
serve played an inordinate role in
his life. The price he paid was
high. The strongest element in the
book remains Forbes' total and
accurate recall of the fierceness
and confusion of battle whether
it was in Normandy, at Walcheren
or in those hectic four days in
Korea in November 1951. Here is
a very close approximation to the
descriptions of combat and its
effects as depicted by Mowat in
And No Birds Sang. In some
ways, Forbes outdoes Mowat for
he avoids inventiveness of any
kind for effect ... the price Mowat
admits he pays for being a writer.
From the shaky start as a
cadet at RMC when he first
displayed his independence by
refusing to sing "God Save the
King" while insistently repeating
the words of "0 Canada" as his
national anthem in the company
of another recalcitrant, Philippe
Rousseau (later killed with his
brother in the 1st Canadian
Parachute Battalion) through to
the day he is declared redundant
by
a
budget
conscious
government, Forbes has been his
own man and hundreds have
shaken their heads in amazement
and admiration at his skills as a

leader and his joie de vivre as a
man.
The photos in this book
excellently illustrate the closeness
that existed between Charly and
his comrades-in-arms. But the
book's saving grace is its candour.
Whether Charly is reflecting upon
conscription, the criminality of
the
Dieppe raid,
battle
exhaustion, the death of a platoon
sergeant, the devoted Maisie
padre,
Marchand,
the
incompetence of some officers,
the Yank bug-out on 355 or his
own shortcomings ... what the
reader comes away with is a
lasting impression of having met
an extraordinary man.
The
book ends
with
anecdotes ranging from the comic
to the tragic and the last notes are
a humble tribute to his comrades,
especially the junior officers with
whom he served. As I close, one
word keeps buzzing insistently in
my head: compassion. It is this
quality that permeates Charly
Forbes' life-compassion for those
who have had to put up with the
arrogance, stupidity and
incompetence too frequently the
companions of power.
A translation of this re-edited
book would be a very good thing.
Gil Drolet

*****

The Battle of the
Generals
Martin Blumenson. The Battle of
the Generals: The Untold Story
of the Falaise Pocket - The
Campaign that Should have won
World War II. New York: William

Morrow and Company, 1993.
pp.288. $29.95.
artin Blumenson writes that
the Allies' failure to close the
"Falaise pocket" was the result of
three basic conditions of the
Allied campaign: the undue
weight of the invasion plan, the
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tensions within the coalition,
and the less than adequate
abilities of the leaders at the top.
(p.23) Ignoring for the moment
that the proximity of large
numbers of trigger-happy
Germans may have had an
impact on the course of the
battle and the decisions taken by
the high command, let me
quickly summarize Blumenson's
argument. Over a third of the
book is devoted to context:
outlining the major personalities
involved, the Allied coalition from
the top down (including lengthy
discussions on Roosevelt and
Churchill), the struggle for
dominance within the alliance,
the German defences and
strategic plans as well as a
summary of the course of war
from 1939. This, he believes, is
the necessary pretext for a series
of errors that culminated in the
campaign that. according to the
title, should have "won the war."
His points follow in
succession. The emphasis on
moving into Germany as rapidly
as possible instead of destroying
the German forces in Normandy
and the continued dispatch of
formations to liberate Brittany
are two examples used to
illustrate the Allies' dependence
on their preconceived plans and
that no one at the top firmly
grasped the reigns. Eisenhower,
Montgomery and Bradley do not
come off well in this account;
Bradley, in particular, is
Blumenson's whipping horse:
insecure and ambivalent. While
this is not new, the author's
criticisms of Bradley have, in the
past, been tempered with a
recognition of the difficulties he
faced. Patton emerges as the hero
in this account and the
unrecognized saviour of Allied
fortunes. "No wonder Patton," he
writes, "dreamed of being the
Supreme Commander. He would
take absolute hold of the
operations and surround and
destroy all the Germans in
Normandy with resolution and
finality." (p.223) Blumenson

speculates that an EisenhowerMontgomery-Patton combination
would have been more successful;
his own quotes from Patton's
correspondence make one
wonder whether as an equal he
would only have been as
obnoxious to these men's faces as
he was in his diary.
Written from the US
perspective, the Canadians are, of
course, given short shrift,
although they can not escape the
"everyone was to blame" tone of
the book. Worse, he uses the
unsubstantiated view that
"residual tensions between"
Crerar and Simonds" (p.183)
influenced the Canadian military
fortunes during this period.
Although it fits nicely with his
theme, it isn't true. Neither is his
grasp of the Canadian part in the
battle complete. He implies, for
example, that it was after the
pause on the morning of 8th, and
"to get the endeavour (Totalize)
started again" that Simonds
ordered a second bombardment
and the two inexperienced
armoured divisions forward.
(p.185)
Does any of this story sound
vaguely familiar? It should; this
is hardly an untold story.
Blumenson has himself written
two direct accounts of the battle
("General Bradley's Decision at
Argentan"
in
Command
Decisions and Breakout and
Pursuit, two volumes of the
Official History of the United
States Army in World War II) and
dealt with it in other works.
Blumenson's previous efforts
have
not
focused
on
personalities; rather, he limited
himself to examining the
opera tiona! possibilities and
restrictions. He was also more
balanced in his conclusions. His
ire has risen with new evidence
that more Germans escaped than
he previously estimated.
Could the battle have won the
war? No one can say for sure; a
victory would certainly not have
alleviated the Allies' supply
problems. Indeed, in previous

battles the Germans had
sustained greater losses and not
crumbled; they were still fighting
while the Russians pounded the
bunkers in Berlin. Clearly, on the
Allied side there was waffling at
the top with regards to objectives
and poor decisions (Bradley's
order to Patton not to go on to
Falaise and beyond to meet the
Canadians) but clearly they were
also
wary
of
German
counterattacks. The central point
seems that with the fog of war, no
one was sure whether the
Germans were still in the pocket;
as a result they wavered on
whether to slam the door shut or
focus on the Seine or both.
Blumenson's account smacks far
too much of hindsight. Similarly,
the problem with examining the
failures of the Allies and
proposing better solutions is that
it presumes the Germans would
have gone along with the altemate
plans proposed, stopped trying to
fight their way out and given up.
Nevertheless, the book is a good
read and summarizes a lot of
material, painting deft portraits
of the Allied commanders; its
story isn't untold but Blumenson
tells it better than some.
Paul Dickson
University of Guelph

*****

Merry Hearts Make
Light Days
Donald Graves, ed. Merry Hearts
Make Light Days. The War of
1812 Journal of Lieutenant John
Le Couteur, 1 04th Foot.
n May of 1812 the brig Ann
headed westward from England
into the Atlantic carrying a
number of British army officers
towards Canada. The vessel
encountered its first gale while
they were at dinner, and a 17year-old lieutenant described the
resulting chaos: "The old brig was
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